Conference Papers

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://idr.nitk.ac.in/handle/123456789/28506

Browse

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Item
    A GNSS Position Spoofing Mitigation Algorithm using Sparse Estimation
    (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2022) Pardhasaradhi, B.; Gunnery, G.; Mahipathi, A.C.; Srihari, P.; Cenkarmaddi, L.R.
    The Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are widespread for providing Position, Velocity, and Time (PVT) information across the globe. The GNSS usually employs the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) framework to estimate the PVT information of the receiver. The GNSS receivers PVT information is falsified by using a mimic GNSS signals is called a spoofing attack. This paper focuses mainly to combat the spoofing attack using sparse estimation theory. A generalized mathematical model is proposed for authentic and spoofed pseudoranges at the GNSS receiver. After that, a generalized pseudorange measurement model is presented by combining the authentic and spoofed pseudorange measurements. It is assumed that, only a part of satellite signals are spoofed. Further, the GNSS receiver's state is estimated by mitigating the spoofed pseudoranges and it is formulated as a Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) optimization problem. The simulated results, compares the proposed LASSO based EKF algorithm with traditional EKF framework. It is observed that, the proposed algorithm suppresses the spoofing effect. Moreover, the Position Root Mean Square Error (PRMSE) of the proposed algorithm decreases by increasing the number of spoofed measurements. © 2022 IEEE.
  • Item
    On Cryptographic Approaches for Detecting GNSS Spoofing Attacks
    (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2024) Ramalingam, J.; Maned, V.R.
    The increasing adoption of technologies dependent on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) services has prompted many countries to develop their own navigation, positioning, and timing (PNT) systems. Spoofing GNSS signals is a significant security issue as it can undermine the reliability of GNSS positioning and timing services. In this paper, we analyze the efficacy of the Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) schemes proposed for GPS (USA) and Galileo (Europe). We demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Chameleon hash key-chain proposed for GPS signal authentication and establish that standard digital signatures offer better performance than Chameleon hash key-chain in this context. © 2024 IEEE.