On Cryptographic Approaches for Detecting GNSS Spoofing Attacks

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dc.contributor.authorRamalingam, J.
dc.contributor.authorManed, V.R.
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-06T06:33:56Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThe increasing adoption of technologies dependent on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) services has prompted many countries to develop their own navigation, positioning, and timing (PNT) systems. Spoofing GNSS signals is a significant security issue as it can undermine the reliability of GNSS positioning and timing services. In this paper, we analyze the efficacy of the Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) schemes proposed for GPS (USA) and Galileo (Europe). We demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Chameleon hash key-chain proposed for GPS signal authentication and establish that standard digital signatures offer better performance than Chameleon hash key-chain in this context. © 2024 IEEE.
dc.identifier.citation2024 IEEE Space, Aerospace and Defence Conference, SPACE 2024, 2024, Vol., , p. 384-388
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/SPACE63117.2024.10667943
dc.identifier.urihttps://idr.nitk.ac.in/handle/123456789/28933
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
dc.subjectChameleon Hash Key-chain
dc.subjectGNSS
dc.subjectGPS
dc.subjectNMA
dc.subjectSchnorr signatures
dc.subjectTESLA
dc.titleOn Cryptographic Approaches for Detecting GNSS Spoofing Attacks

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