Faculty Publications
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Publications by NITK Faculty
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Item Delivery lead time competition between e-tailers: A game-theoretic study(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021) Raju, S.; Rofin, T.M.; Kumar, S.In the study, we analyse the impact of delivery time on the pricing, sales volume and profitability of a dual-channel supply chain consisting of manufacturer, retailer and e-tailer. We used the Stackelberg game to model the game between upstream and downstream channel partners and the horizontal Nash game to model the interaction between the e-tailers. Later we solved some numerical examples to develop the corollaries. It was found that the optimal price, sales volume and optimal profit significantly decreased when the delivery time was high and using game theory, we quantify the decrease. It was also observed that by regulating the customer preference towards the channel, this decrease can be controlled. © 2021 IEEE.Item Game Theoretic Approach for Electric Vehicles Charging Solution: A Study of the Interplay between Time, Price and Location(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2023) Patel, J.; Manjappa, M.Due to their potential in lowering gas emissions, the number of Electric Vehicles, which are eco-friendly, has rapidly increased in recent years and they have achieved immense popularity, creating a lot of interest in the industry and research. But, finding a Charging Station during critical low battery situations is a difficult time for Electric Vehicle users. In an Intelligent Transport System, the goal of each Electric Vehicles is to choose the Charging Station with the lowest cost by taking into account the location, charging rate, and other parameters whereas the goal of a Charging Station is to maximize its revenue by increasing its price based on the number of vehicles waiting in the Charging Station. We employ a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game model to interplay between the Electric Vehicles and Charging Stations, in which location, waiting time, and price factor are considered as parameters. To find the best CS for EVs we formulate our own cost function by considering real-life parameters like the distance of the EV to the CS, waiting time at the station, time to charge the battery, price of unit charge, state of EV charging. The performance of the proposed approach is demonstrated by experiments with different EV densities, their need (units required to charge the battery), and preferences. The results are encouraging. © 2023 IEEE.Item Retailing and pricing decisions in a three-tier fabless semiconductor supply chain with stochastic consumption rate and channel power structures under sustainability measures(Taylor and Francis Ltd., 2024) Raju, S.; Tm, R.; Kumar, S.P.; Taleizadeh, A.A.This study investigates the trade-off between sustainability measures and pricing strategies within a three-tier fabless semiconductor supply chain. We examine diverse configurations of channel power to identify the optimal power structure when integrating sustainability measures into the semiconductor foundry. The Stackelberg game, Vertical Nash game, and Mean-Variance analysis are employed to model the complex dynamics among channel partners. The findings indicate that for a specific threshold limit of manufacturing and sustainability costs, implementing sustainability measures not only increases the optimal price for foundry but also enhances the margin and sales volume for the fabless company, leading to improved profits for all chain partners. Examining channel power structures reveals the threshold limit of sustainability cost which maximise the profit for the channel leader and the channel follower. Additionally, lower price elasticity favours maximum profits under channel leadership, whereas higher price elasticity values result in higher optimal profits when both partners share comparable channel power. The study also identifies the significant influence of partners’ risk aversion on overall profitability and offers valuable insights for practicing managers in the fabless supply chain, providing guidance on optimising pricing strategies, navigating channel power dynamics, considering price elasticity, and managing risk aversion to enhance overall profitability. © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.Item Impact of green retail operations on the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer under different pricing strategies(Springer, 2021) Rofin, T.M.; Singha Mahapatra, M.S.; Mahanty, B.The increasing customer awareness of environmental sustainability has motivated retailers to engage in green practices. In this paper, we consider a retailer involved in green retailing operations under a dual-channel supply chain framework under which the manufacturer is selling through an e-marketplace and a retailer. We investigate the impact of green retailing operations on the profit of the supply chain members for consistent pricing strategy and inconsistent pricing strategy using a non-linear demand function. We resort to a bi-level genetic algorithm for the solutions. Through a numerical example, we have quantified the profit of the chain members and assessed the impact of the retailer’s engagement in green retail operations on the profit of the chain members. We have also carried out a sensitivity analysis of the profit of the chain members for the rapidly evolving customer preference for e-marketplace. From the numerical illustration, we found that (1) it is beneficial for the retailer to engage in green retail operations irrespective of the pricing strategy (2) retailer’s engagement in green retail operations reduces the profit of the manufacturer regardless of the pricing strategy of the retailer. © 2020, Operational Research Society of India.Item Impact of wholesale price discrimination on the profit of chain members under different channel power structures(Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) Rofin, T.M.; Mahanty, B.The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer on the profitability of chain members in a Retailer—E-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference. We have considered two distinct channel power structures in this study, i.e., (i) retailer has higher channel power than the e-tailer and (ii) e-tailer has higher channel power than the retailer. Game-theoretic models are developed to examine the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal decisions under equal wholesale price strategy and discriminatory wholesale price strategy for the channel power structures considered. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product. We have found that discriminatory wholesale price strategy is the gainful strategy (i) for a manufacturer dealing with products having high online channel preference under retailer leader structure (ii) for the manufacturer dealing with products having low online channel preference under e-tailer leader structure. Equal wholesale price strategy is the gainful strategy (i) for a manufacturer dealing with products having low online channel preference under retailer leader structure and (ii) for a manufacturer dealing with products having high online channel preference under e-tailer leader structure. The study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product and the downstream channel power structure. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.Item Do wholesale pricing strategies matter during asymmetric disruptions? A game theoretic analysis(Emerald Publishing, 2024) Raju, S.; Tm, R.; S, P.K.; Jacob, J.Purpose: In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions. Design/methodology/approach: For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store. Findings: By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP. Originality/value: Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption. © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited.
