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Item GNSS Spoofing Detection and Mitigation in Multireceiver Configuration via Tracklets and Spoofer Localization(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2022) Pardhasaradhi, B.; Gunnery, G.; Vandana, G.S.; Srihari, P.; Aparna., P.Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) sensors estimate its position, velocity, and time (PVT) using pseudorange measurements. When there is no interference, the pseudoranges are due to authentic satellites, and the bearings is distinguishable. Whereas, in the presence of any intentional interference source like spoofer, the pseudorange measurements owing to spurious signals and all the bearings from the same direction. These spurious attacks yield either no position or falsified position to the GNSS receiver. This paper proposes to install multiple GNSS receivers on a vehicle (assumed to be cooperative) to detect and mitigate the spoofing attack. While installing multiple GNSS receivers, we assume that each GNSS receiver's relative position vector (RPV) is assumed to be known to other GNSS receivers. The installed GNSS receivers use the extended Kalman filter (EKF) framework to estimate their PVT. We proposed to calculate the equivalent-measurement and equivalent-measurement covariance of each GNSS receiver in the Cartesian coordinates in the tracklet framework. These tracklets are translated to the vehicle center using RPV to obtain translated-Tracklets. The translated tracklet based generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) is derived to detect the spoofing attack at a given epoch. In addition to that, these translated-Tracklets are processed in a batch least square (LS) framework to obtain the vehicle position. Once the attack is detected at a specific epoch, it quantifies that the position information is false. Moreover, another spoofing test is also formulated using DOA of signals. Once both the tests confirm the spoofing attack, the spoofer localization is performed using pseudo-updated states of GNSS receivers and acquired bearings in the iterative least-squares (ILS) framework. Mitigation of spoofing attack can be achieved either by projecting a null beam in the direction of the spoofer or by launching a counter-Attack on the spoofer. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm detects spoofing attacks and ensures continuity in the navigation track. As the number of satellite signals increases, the algorithms provide better position root mean square error (PRMSE) for GNSS receivers track, vehicle track, and spoofer localization. © 2013 IEEE.Item Position estimation in indoor using networked GNSS sensors and a range-azimuth sensor(Elsevier B.V., 2022) Pardhasaradhi, B.; Gunnery, G.; Raghu, J.; Srihari, P.The global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) receivers suffer from determining an accurate position estimate in the indoor region due to non-line of sight (Non-LOS) conditions. This paper proposes a novel method of position estimation within the indoor region by using distributed GNSS sensors and a range-azimuth sensor setup. All the GNSS sensors are connected to a central node; the inaccurate position estimates evolved from the Kalman filter (KF) framework are transmitted to a central node as primary data. The deviation between the inaccurate position estimate and the GNSS sensor's actual position is the positional deviation (PD) vector, which needs to be estimated. In the same indoor region, a range-azimuth sensor is also deployed. It estimates the GNSS sensor's physical location in its local coordinates, and these estimates are being transmitted to a central node as secondary data. Further, by using the primary and secondary data, we formulated a PD vector compensation followed by a sequential fusion (SF) framework to derive the precise locations of both GNSS sensors and the range-azimuth sensor by recursively estimating the PD vector. Finally, the Cramer–Rao lower bound (CRLB) for the proposed framework is derived. The simulation results are quantified with the root mean square error (RMSE) and CRLB. © 2022 Elsevier B.V.