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Browsing by Author "Mahendra, D."

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    Security protocol for distributed networks using formal method specification
    (2016) Nandewal, A.; Mahendra, D.; Chandrasekaran, K.
    Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As our systems communicate more and more with others that we know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other, we cannot rely upon enforcement of the appropriate access control policy to protect us. Instead we must build our defenses, as much as possible, into the protocols themselves. This paper shows how some principles that have already been used to make protocols more resistant to denial of service can be specified and verified. We specify a protocol for distributed networks and specify, verify it using general formal methods. � 2016 IEEE.
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    Security protocol for distributed networks using formal method specification
    (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016) Nandewal, A.; Mahendra, D.; Chandrasekaran, K.
    Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As our systems communicate more and more with others that we know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other, we cannot rely upon enforcement of the appropriate access control policy to protect us. Instead we must build our defenses, as much as possible, into the protocols themselves. This paper shows how some principles that have already been used to make protocols more resistant to denial of service can be specified and verified. We specify a protocol for distributed networks and specify, verify it using general formal methods. © 2016 IEEE.

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