Browsing by Author "Ketankumar, D.C."

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    A Green Mechanism Design Approach to Automate Resource Procurement in Cloud
    (Elsevier, 2015) Ketankumar, D.C.; Verma, G.; Chandrasekaran, K.
    Cloud computing paradigm is emerging as the solution to all the infrastructure setup problems of IT industry. But the thriving demand of cloud infrastructure has increased the energy consumption of the data centers drastically. As the energy consumption of the data center rises, it leads us to high carbon emissions which are dangerous for the environment. In this paper, we propose a green cloud broker for resource procurement problem by considering the metrics of energy efficiency and environmental friendly operations of the cloud service provider. We use mechanism design methods to decide the allocation and payment for the submitted job dynamically. We perform experiments and show the results of comparisons of energy consumption and emission of greenhouse gases between the allocation decided by the proposed green cloud broker and a without taking the green metric into consideration. © 2015 The Authors.
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    A stackelberg game to incentivize cooperation in BitTorrent
    (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015) Ketankumar, D.C.; Chandrasekaran, K.
    This paper presents a Stackelberg game between the tracker and peer of a torrent in a BitTorrent community which incentivizes cooperation amongst peers. We propose a change in the allocation of peers to a peer by tracker and suggest modifications in the allocation algorithm rather than keeping it completely random. By this change the role of tracker in a BitTorrent community is promoted from just a point of contact amongst peers to a moderator of cooperation among connected peers. As leechers in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we mitigate this selfish behavior by incentivizing the peers with high upload-download ratio by awarding them with more peers to connect with and we punish the selfish peers who do not contribute more than a threshold value by limiting the number of peers allocated to them. We use a game theoretic model to prove that dominant strategy equilibrium exists in such game and the strategy to achieve this equilibrium is to cooperate for each peer. We further simulate the suggested incentive mechanism experimentally using Network Simulator 2.29 and prove the effectiveness of our results. © 2015 IEEE.
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    A Green Mechanism Design Approach to Automate Resource Procurement in Cloud
    (2015) Ketankumar, D.C.; Verma, G.; Chandrasekaran, K.
    Cloud computing paradigm is emerging as the solution to all the infrastructure setup problems of IT industry. But the thriving demand of cloud infrastructure has increased the energy consumption of the data centers drastically. As the energy consumption of the data center rises, it leads us to high carbon emissions which are dangerous for the environment. In this paper, we propose a green cloud broker for resource procurement problem by considering the metrics of energy efficiency and environmental friendly operations of the cloud service provider. We use mechanism design methods to decide the allocation and payment for the submitted job dynamically. We perform experiments and show the results of comparisons of energy consumption and emission of greenhouse gases between the allocation decided by the proposed green cloud broker and a without taking the green metric into consideration. � 2015 The Authors.
  • No Thumbnail Available
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    A stackelberg game to incentivize cooperation in BitTorrent
    (2015) Ketankumar, D.C.; Chandrasekaran, K.
    This paper presents a Stackelberg game between the tracker and peer of a torrent in a BitTorrent community which incentivizes cooperation amongst peers. We propose a change in the allocation of peers to a peer by tracker and suggest modifications in the allocation algorithm rather than keeping it completely random. By this change the role of tracker in a BitTorrent community is promoted from just a point of contact amongst peers to a moderator of cooperation among connected peers. As leechers in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we mitigate this selfish behavior by incentivizing the peers with high upload-download ratio by awarding them with more peers to connect with and we punish the selfish peers who do not contribute more than a threshold value by limiting the number of peers allocated to them. We use a game theoretic model to prove that dominant strategy equilibrium exists in such game and the strategy to achieve this equilibrium is to cooperate for each peer. We further simulate the suggested incentive mechanism experimentally using Network Simulator 2.29 and prove the effectiveness of our results. � 2015 IEEE.